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Tasks for which people must act together to achieve a goal are a feature of daily life. The
present study explored social influences on joint action using a Simon procedure for
which participants (n = 44) were confronted with a series of images of hands and asked
to respond via button press whenever the index finger wore a ring of a certain color
(red or green) regardless of pointing direction (left or right). In an initial joint condition
they performed the task while sitting next to another person (friend or stranger) who
responded to the other color. In a subsequent individual condition they repeated the task
on their own; additionally, they completed self-report tests of empathy. Consistent with
past research, participants reacted more quickly when the finger pointed toward them
rather than their co-actor (the Simon Effect or SE). The effect remained robust when
the co-actor was no longer present and was unaffected by degree of acquaintance;
however, its magnitude was correlated positively with empathy only among friends. For
friends, the SE was predicted by cognitive perspective taking when the co-actor was
present and by propensity for fantasizing when the co-actor was absent. We discuss
these findings in relation to social accounts (e.g., task co-representation) and non-social
accounts (e.g., referential coding) of joint action.
Keywords: joint Simon effect, joint action, task co-representation, referential coding, perspective taking, empathy
Introduction
Social activities often require careful co-ordination of behaviors between people, for example, when
they dance together, play games or competitive sport, work in unison to build things, and engage in
cultural transmission of artifacts and technology. Given the ubiquity of such activities in daily life,
understanding the mechanisms of eﬀective collaboration is essential. In laboratory studies, one of
the most widely used paradigms for investigating joint action has been the joint Simon task devised
by Sebanz et al. (2003).
In an individual Simon task, participants are asked to respond to the color of stimuli presented
on a computer monitor (e.g., pressing a left key when a red stimulus appears or pressing a right
key when a green stimulus appears) while ignoring the spatial location of the stimulus (left versus
right of the monitor). The term Simon Eﬀect (SE) refers to the ﬁnding that participants react faster
when the spatial relationship between stimulus and response is compatible (e.g., pressing a left
key in response to a stimulus on the left) than when it is incompatible (e.g., pressing a left key in
response to a stimulus on the right; review by Lu and Proctor, 1995). Although the SE typically
vanishes when participants are asked to respond to only one stimulus color in a go/no-go version
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of the task, it reappears during the joint Simon task – that is, when
they perform their role while seated next to another person who
is responsible for carrying out the alternative response (e.g., with
the person seated on the left responding solely to red stimuli and
the person sitting on the right responding solely to green stimuli).
The phenomenon of a spatial compatibility eﬀect under joint-
action conditions has been termed the joint SE (review by Dolk
et al., 2014).
Sebanz et al. (2003, 2005a) speculated that the joint SE arises
because participants internalize their partner’s contribution to
the activity, thus generating a shared task representation that
interferes with their responses to ‘go’ signals when the irrelevant
stimulus dimension primes the co-actor’s role instead. This
suggestion is in line with ideomotor theory, which supposes that
action and action perception are closely coupled and, hence, that
either observing or anticipating another person’s motor responses
activates the same representational structures as if the responses
were self-generated (e.g., Jeannerod, 1999). A related account
holds that the joint SE reﬂects actor co-representation rather than
task co-representation; speciﬁcally, diﬃculties are attributed to
the fact that participants have to decide whose turn is signaled on
each trial rather than because they mentally depict exactly what
their co-actor is supposed to do (Philipp and Prinz, 2010; Wenke
et al., 2011).
Sebanz et al. (2003) discovered that there is no need for on-
line feedback about the co-actor’s responses to produce the joint
SE. Because the eﬀect was robust when the co-actor performed
the complementary role but their hand was hidden from view,
results were taken to mean that the joint SE is triggered when
participants ﬁrst encode their co-actor’s contribution to the task.
It has further been shown that the joint SE appears even when
participants sit outside each other’s peripersonal space (Welsh
et al., 2013). However, there is conﬂicting evidence regarding
whether participants need to be able to see each other at all.
The joint SE has been observed when participants perform the
task from diﬀerent rooms (Tsai et al., 2008), and when they are
prevented from seeing and hearing each other during the activity
(Vlainic et al., 2010). In contrast, two studies found no joint SE
when co-actors were physically separated (Welsh et al., 2007;
Sellaro et al., 2013).
Notably, the size of the joint SE has been shown to vary
according to the interpersonal relationship of the co-actors. For
example, it is accentuated when participants are paired with a
partner who is friendly and supportive rather than unfriendly
and intimidating (Hommel et al., 2009), or who is perceived
as an in-group member rather than out-group member (Müller
et al., 2011b; McClung et al., 2013). It is similarly increased when
participants are engaged in an activity that encourages thoughts
of inter-personal connectedness (Colzato et al., 2012a), promotes
a positive- rather than negative mood (Kuhbandner et al., 2010),
or encourages interdependence rather than autonomy (Ruys and
Aarts, 2010). It has even been reported that Buddhists showed
a greater joint SE than atheists, a phenomenon attributed to
heightened awareness of, and caring for, other people in the
former group (Colzato et al., 2012b). Although the joint SE fails
to emerge when participants perform the task together with a
mechanical agent (Tsai et al., 2008), it can be restored if the agent
is described as “active and intelligent” rather than “passive and
purely deterministic” (Stenzel et al., 2012) or is endowed with
other human characteristics (Müller et al., 2011a).
Several studies have evaluated the joint SE in participants
who have profound impairments of social cognition, such as
individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), schizophrenia,
or brain injury. In a study that tested high-functioning adults
with ASD, Sebanz et al. (2005b) noted that the eﬀect was
intact – a ﬁnding they interpreted to mean that individuals with
ASD have normal capacity for mapping observed actions onto
mental representations of self-performed actions. In contrast,
the joint SE failed to emerge in patients with schizophrenia
(Liepelt et al., 2012) whereas mixed ﬁndings were obtained with
brain-damaged adults who performed poorly on theory-of-mind
tests (Humphreys and Bedford, 2011). The latter study found
that participants did not show a joint SE given standard task
instructions although the eﬀect emerged (to some extent) if they
were requested to pay particular attention to their co-actor. Based
on these results, Humphreys and Bedford (2011) concluded that
the joint SE is linked to social-cognitive abilities. They further
speculated that the reason Sebanz et al. (2005b) did ﬁnd a joint
SE in their ASD sample was because these high-functioning
participants generally succeeded in passing tests of ﬁrst- and
second-order belief attribution.
The evidence reviewed so far implicates an important
contribution of social factors to the joint SE, consistent with
notions about task and agent co-representation. Nevertheless,
there are grounds for querying whether it is truly a social
phenomenon. Guagnano et al. (2010) suggested that the joint
SE merely reﬂects participants’ spatial coding of the activity,
coding that is heightened when the experimental conditions
emphasize collaboration rather than individual performance.
On their account, participants do not consider their co-actor’s
agency or intentionality when performing the joint Simon task;
rather, the joint SE emerges because the co-actor provides a
frame of reference that transforms the participant’s perception
of their role from simple button press to either left or right
button press (see also, Dittrich et al., 2012, 2013). Consistent with
this interpretation, Guagnano et al. (2010) showed that joint SE
depends on the physical proximity of the co-actors, with greater
separation associated with a smaller eﬀect.
Alternatively, a referential coding argument draws on the
theory of event coding (TEC: Hommel et al., 2001) in proposing
that the joint SE reﬂects conﬂict between concurrently active
event representations (which comprise information regarding
the perceptual characteristics of the actions and their sensory
consequences). This concurrent activation is thought to pose
a discrimination problem that participants attempt to solve
by focusing on features that best diﬀerentiate the competing
representations – which in a typical joint Simon task is usually
the left/right location of the responses (Dolk et al., 2011, 2014).
Unlike the spatial response coding explanation, a referential
coding view succeeds in accounting for evidence that the social
similarity of the two co-actors inﬂuences the magnitude of the
joint SE; speciﬁcally, it is assumed that greater perceptual and
conceptual overlap between event representations increases the
likelihood that participants will try to distinguish between them
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by linking them with their respective spatial locations. In line
with notions about referential coding, Dolk et al. (2013) obtained
reliable SEs in an auditory version of the joint Simon procedure
which emphasized the horizontal dimension using a variety of
non-animate objects, including a Japanese waving cat, a clock,
and a ticking metronome. The eﬀect disappeared using an object
that was less attention-grabbing (a silent metronome), ruling out
the possibility that the placement of the objects by a human
experimenter leant them social signiﬁcance.
The Present Study
In the present study we took a novel approach to evaluating
social inﬂuences on the jointly performed Simon task by assessing
participants for trait empathy. Despite evidence that the joint SE
depends on participants’ mood (Kuhbandner et al., 2010) and
relationship with the co-actor (Hommel et al., 2009; Müller et al.,
2011b; McClung et al., 2013) no previous research has explored
sources of individual diﬀerences in the size of the eﬀect. Based on
the aforementioned evidence, we expected that the magnitude of
the joint SE would be greater among participants who are more
empathic.
We evaluated empathy comprehensively by measuring both
cognitive and aﬀective components. Whereas cognitive empathy
involves the ability to ponder other people’s intentions and
beliefs (i.e., theory-of-mind), aﬀective empathy reﬂects our
immediate emotional responsiveness to others’ feelings. These
two types of empathy appear to rely on diﬀerent brain systems;
neuroimaging evidence suggests that cognitive empathy engages
the temporo-parietal junction, medial parietal cortex, and medial
prefrontal cortex, with aﬀective empathy instead relying on the
anterior midcingulate cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex,
and bilateral anterior insula (Frith and Frith, 2003; Bernhardt
and Singer, 2012) and possibly involving a mirror neuron system
that elicits spontaneous mimicry of others’ observed emotional
states (Iacoboni, 2009). In relation to the Simon task, previous
research suggests that cognitive empathy is likely to have a greater
inﬂuence on the joint SE. An impact of cognitive empathy is
implicated by the ﬁnding that the eﬀect is lacking among brain-
injured patients who fail theory-of-mind tests (Humphreys and
Bedford, 2011). Moreover, the theory-of-mind network handles
the reading of others’ intentions and appears to play an important
role in maintaining the distinction between self and other (review
by Decety and Sommerville, 2003).
Importantly, we also explored whether any possible inﬂuence
of empathy on the joint SE was aﬀected by the degree of
prior acquaintance between the co-actors; speciﬁcally, we were
interested in the possibility that eﬀects of empathy might be
accentuated for actors who were well acquainted. Given evidence
that the perception of self-other overlap is increased when people
know each other well (e.g., Myers and Hodges, 2012), we asked
participants to perform the joint Simon task with either a friend
(who signed up for the experiment at the same time) or a
stranger (who signed up individually). The need to take account
of relational context when researching human social behavior
has been gaining recognition, especially in regards to kinship
and friendship (reviews by Beckes and Coan, 2013; Clark-Polner
and Clark, 2014). People empathize more readily with those who
are familiar to them or who share similar social characteristics
(Preston and de Waal, 2002; Decety and Lamm, 2006). For
example, it has been reported that brain activations in response
to self-focused threat mimic those elicited by threat to a friend
but not by threat to a stranger (Beckes et al., 2013) and that the
physiological arousal experienced by ﬁre-walkers is tightly bound
with that of the spectators only when such spectators are friends
or relatives (Konvalinka et al., 2011). Such evidence indicates
that the perception/action coupling mechanisms underpinning
empathy are modulated by brain centers involved in processing
of social information and, consequently, that the experience
of empathy is heightened when the neural representations of
self- versus other show greater overlap (Beckes et al., 2013). It
therefore follows that if empathy inﬂuences the joint SE then the
trend should be augmented when the co-actors are friends.
After completing the joint version of the Simon task, all
participants were asked to perform the same task individually;
that is, seated in the same chair as before and making the same
response they had been responsible for in the earlier joint version.
Although previous studies have observed no spatial compatibility
eﬀect in the individual (one-handed, go/no-go) Simon task, we
wanted to see whether this would still hold true if the individual
condition followed the joint condition and conformed to its
procedure in all respects apart from the absence of the co-
actor. Both social and non-social accounts of the joint SE suggest
that the eﬀect is likely to endure under these conditions. On a
social account, such a scenario could give rise to thoughts of
the co-actor performing their complementary role that reinforce
participants’ task sharing or agent co-representation. On a non-
social account, by contrast, the participants could carry forward
with them the spatial response mappings that they acquired
during the earlier joint procedure – a possibility in line with
evidence that the SE emerges in the individual go/no-go Simon
task when participants have recently performed the standard
two-handed version (Ansorge and Wühr, 2009). In such an
eventuality it will be of interest to compare the relations between
empathy and the SE in the joint and individual conditions. For
example, if empathy predicts the magnitude of the eﬀect only
when participants perform the task in the company of their co-
actor then this could suggest that the joint task elicits genuine
social processes that are lacking in the individual task.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants were 44 undergraduate students at Griﬃth
University, ranging in age from 17- to 44 years (M = 22.50,
SD = 5.49), who received course credit or a small payment
depending on how they were recruited. All participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal near vision, were not red–green
color blind, and had no impairments of manual co-ordination.
They either signed up as part of a friendship pair (n = 22; 15
females; mean age = 21.5) or were assigned to the stranger
condition (n = 22; 17 females; mean age = 23.5), with 11
pairs (10 same-gender and one mixed-gender) in each case.
The ‘friend’ and ‘stranger’ groups did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in
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terms of either age, t(42) = −1.27, p = 0.210, or gender ratio,
χ2(1, N = 22) = 0.46, p = 0.498.
Materials and procedure
Procedures for the study were approved by the Griﬃth University
Human Research Ethics Committee. Upon arrival at the
laboratory, participants who had signed up for the stranger
condition were introduced to their partner for the joint task.
Otherwise, the researcher questioned the participants who had
signed up for the friend condition to ensure that they met
the criteria for inclusion in this condition (i.e., close friends
who socialized with one another often and had known each
other for at least 6 months). Following this process, participants
completed four activities in a single test session lasting no more
than an hour. These comprised (1) the joint Simon task, (2)
the individual Simon task, (3) the Empathy Quotient (EQ), and
(4) the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). All participants
completed the joint version of the Simon task as the ﬁrst activity
of the test session. Following this, one member of each pair
performed the individual version while the other completed the
empathy questionnaires; subsequently, their roles were reversed.
For participants who performed the individual task straight after
the joint task, there was a break of 3–4 min while the researcher
accompanied the co-actor to the adjacent room and explained
the procedure for completing the empathy questionnaires. For
the remaining participants, the individual task was performed
around 15 min after the joint task (the average time taken to
complete the empathy questionnaires). On each occasion the
Simon task comprised a block of eight practice trials followed by
200 test trials.
Joint and Individual Simon Tasks
The joint and individual Simon tasks were administered using
a Dell laptop computer with Windows XP operating system.
The computer had a screen resolution of 1440 × 1020 pixels;
the program was run at this same screen resolution. A pair
of Microsoft branded computer mice connected to the laptop
via the audio and microphone jacks were used as the input
devices for responding to the stimuli. These computer mice
were programmed to enable simultaneous input, to the same
stimulus, into the computer. Participants viewed a series of
hands presented on the computer monitor that varied in terms
of ring color (green versus red) and pointing direction of the
index ﬁnger (left versus right). This factorial design yielded
four diﬀerent images, namely (1) green ring/pointing left, (2)
green ring/pointing right, (3) red ring/pointing left and (4) red
ring/pointing right (see Figure 1). Participants were requested to
press the button on their mouse either in response to a red ring
(22 participants) or in response to a green ring (22 participants),
regardless of pointing direction. In the former case, for example,
red rings signal ‘go’ trials and green rings signal ‘no go’ trials.
Following the eight practice trials, participants saw 200 images
in total (50 each of four stimulus types) that were presented in
random order, with the proviso that the same color ring could
not appear more than three times in succession.
For the joint condition, participants were seated next to each
other (with a separation of around 30 cm) in front of the
FIGURE 1 | Experimental stimuli; Green pointing left (top left), green
pointing right (top right), red pointing left (bottom left) and red pointing
right (bottom right).
computer monitor with their preferred index ﬁnger resting on the
left button of their mouse. Initially, a set of instructions appeared
on the screen that described the procedure as follows, “You will
see a series of hands appear on the monitor one at a time. Each
hand will be pointing either to the left or to the right and will be
wearing either a green ring or a red ring. The person sitting on
the left should press their button as quickly as possible whenever
the hand is wearing a GREEN ring. The person sitting on the
right should press their button as quickly as possible whenever
the hand is wearing a RED ring. Your reaction times (RTs) and
accuracy will be recorded. Please place the index ﬁnger of your
dominant hand on your button and get ready to start.” The
capitalized color words were either green or red as appropriate
whereas the remaining text was black. After practicing the task,
participants were given the opportunity to ask questions to clarify
aspects of the procedure before the researcher initiated the test
phase. For all participant pairs, the person seated on the left
responded to the green ring whereas the person seated on the
right responded to the red ring.
For the subsequent individual condition, participants were
requested to respond to the same color ring as for the joint
condition. Also, they remained in the same seat on the same
side of the monitor as previously. Thus, the individual condition
diﬀered from the joint condition only in that the participant
completed the task while sitting next to the now-vacated chair of
their partner. Instructions mimicked those provided for the joint
condition except that only one participant was mentioned. For
example, instructions for individuals assigned to the green ring
condition were as follows, “You will see a series of hands appear
on the monitor one at a time. Each hand will be pointing either to
the left or to the right and will be wearing either a green ring or
a red ring. Your task is to press the button as quickly as possible
whenever the hand is wearing a GREEN ring.”
The sequence of events on each individual trial of the task was
as follows: (1) a ﬁxation point (a black cross) displayed for 100ms,
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(2) a blank (white) screen displayed for 100ms, (3) the target
stimulus displayed for 500 ms, and (4) a further blank screen
displayed for 500 ms. Recording of the RTs was initiated from the
instant that the stimulus appeared, giving participants 1000 ms
to respond before the next trial commenced. Compatible trials
were those in which the ﬁnger was aimed at the player receiving
a ‘go’ signal based on ring color (i.e., a ﬁnger pointing left when
wearing a green ring, a ﬁnger pointing right when wearing a red
ring) and incompatible trials were those in which the ﬁnger was
aimed at the player receiving a ‘no go’ signal based on ring color
(i.e., a ﬁnger pointing right when wearing a green ring, a ﬁnger
pointing left when wearing a red ring).
Empathy Measures
Participants completed two empathy questionnaires in an
adjacent room while their co-actor carried out the individual
version of the Simon task.
Empathy quotient
The empathy quotient (EQ) is a self-report measure designed to
assess empathy is normal adult populations (Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright, 2004). It comprises 60 rating-scale questions (40
target questions intermixed with 20 distracter questions) that
yield an overall score encompassing cognitive perspective taking,
aﬀective empathy, and social skills.
Interpersonal reactivity index
The IRI is a self-report measure of cognitive and aﬀective
empathy using 28 rating-scale questions that yield four
separate scores; empathetic concern (i.e., the ability to feel
concern for others), perspective taking (i.e., the ability to
understand another person’s point of view), fantasy (i.e., one’s
propensity for becoming involved in ﬁction and ﬁctional
characters) and personal distress (i.e., feelings that accompany
altruistic behaviors; Davis, 1980). Perspective taking and fantasy
represent cognitive aspects of empathy whereas empathic
concern and personal distress represent aﬀective aspects of
empathy.
Results
Data were screened for normality and univariate outliers both
across- and within groups (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). All
empathy measures and Simon task variables used in the following
analyses had distributions that were acceptably normal. Adopting
a criterion of absolute z> 2.5, a single outlier was identiﬁed in the
friends group; namely, an unusually low score on IRI Perspective
Taking (z = −2.61). In the strangers group, there was one high
outlier in terms of size of the joint SE (z = 3.19). Analyses were
conducted both with and without these cases; because the pattern
of ﬁndings was unaﬀected the analyses reported below included
all participants’ data.
Joint and Individual Simon Tasks
Reaction Times on ‘Go’ Trials
All participants responded accurately on all ‘go’ trials.
Table 1 shows group means and standard deviations of
TABLE 1 | Group mean and SD of response latencies (in milliseconds)
shown separately for compatible and incompatible trials in the joint
condition (top panel) and the subsequent individual condition (bottom
panel).
Compatible Incompatible SE Difference Scores
M SD M SD M SD Range
Joint Condition
Friends 429.68 14.42 438.59 22.64 8.91 19.66 −33 to 48
Strangers 435.05 20.53 438.05 23.53 3.00 13.32 −23 to 22
Overall 432.36 17.74 438.32 22.82 5.95 16.86 −33 to 48
Individual Condition
Friends 429.82 25.93 435.23 24.83 5.41 14.09 −24 to 26
Strangers 435.59 24.34 440.41 20.75 4.82 13.08 −12 to 48
Overall 432.70 25.03 437.82 22.76 5.11 13.44 −24 to 48
RTs in milliseconds, presented separately for compatible
and incompatible trials in the joint condition (top panel)
and the subsequent individual condition (bottom panel).
The far-right columns show descriptive statistics for the
SE, calculated by subtracting RTs on compatible trials from
RTs on incompatible trials. Data were subjected to a 2
(Group: friends vs. strangers) × 2 (Trial Type: compatible
vs. incompatible) × 2 (Player Condition: joint vs. individual)
ANOVA with repeated measures on the second and third
factors. There was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect for trial type,
F(1,42) = 11.14, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.21, reﬂecting faster response
latencies on compatible trials (compatible M = 432.53,
incompatible M = 438.07). In contrast, there were no
signiﬁcant eﬀects of either group (friends M = 433.33, strangers
M = 437.27), F(1,42) = 0.52, p = 0.474, η2p = 0.01, or
player condition (joint M = 435.34, individual M = 435.26),
F(1,42) = 0.00, p = 0.980, η2p = 0.00. Likewise, there
were no reliable interactions, all p-values >0.05 (lowest
p = 0.33).
False Alarms on ‘No Go’ Trials
Participants rarely responded inappropriately on ‘no go’ trials.
There was no evidence that the frequency of such errors was
aﬀected by spatial compatibility (compatible trials M = 0.86,
incompatible trialsM = 0.91), t(43) = 0.36, p= 0.722, η2p = 0.00,
or player condition (joint M = 0.88, individual M = 0.90),
t(43) = 0.17, p = 0.870, η2p = 0.00. However, there were reliably
fewer false alarms among friends (friends M = 0.65, strangers
M = 1.13), t(42) = 2.50, p = 0.016, η2p = 0.13.
Descriptive Statistics for the EQ and IRI
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of scores on the EQ and the
four scales of the IRI. There were no signiﬁcant group diﬀerences
on any of the measures, all p-values >0.05 (lowest p = 0.18).
Results for the whole sample closely approximate normative data
reported in previous research (IRI: Davis, 1980; EQ: Lawrence
et al., 2004). Outcomes for the EQ were positively correlated
with those for IRI Perspective Taking although the eﬀect was
reliable only for strangers; friends r(22) = 0.40, p = 0.067;
strangers r(22)= 0.51, p= 0.016. Similarly, the EQ was positively
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TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics of scores on the Empathy Quotient (EQ) and the four scales of the IRI.
Friends Strangers Whole group
M SD Range M SD Range M SD Range
Full-Scale EQ 44.50 7.64 30–56 47.23 9.46 27–62 45.86 8.61 27–62
IRI: Perspective Taking 16.18 4.79 4–25 17.18 5.00 5–24 16.68 4.87 4–25
IRI: Fantasy Scale 18.05 5.32 5–24 16.59 5.76 5–27 17.32 5.53 5–27
IRI: Empathic Concern 20.23 3.99 9–28 20.23 4.59 10–28 20.23 4.25 9–28
IRI: Personal Distress 10.36 4.86 1–19 12.91 4.51 4–20 11.64 4.81 1–20
Maximum possible scores are as follows: EQ = 80; Each IRI scale = 28.
correlated with IRI Empathic Concern; friends r(22) = 0.44,
p = 0.040; strangers r(22) = 0.72, p < 0.001. In contrast, the
EQ was not signiﬁcantly correlated with IRI Fantasy; friends
r(22) = 0.06, p = 0.782; strangers r(22) = 0.21, p = 0.353,
or IRI Personal Distress; friends r(22) = 0.27, p = 0.234;
strangers r(22) = −0.19, p = 0.402. Likewise, Lawrence et al.
(2004) found reliable correlations between the EQ and the
IRI for the perspective taking scale and the empathic concern
scale but not for the fantasy scale and the personal distress
scale.
Exploring the SE as a Function of Empathy
Table 3 shows Pearson correlations between (1) scores on the EQ
and the four scales of the IRI, and (2) the magnitude of the SE
in the joint- and individual conditions (calculated in each case
by subtracting mean RT on compatible trials from mean RT on
incompatible trials). The correlations are presented for the whole
sample, as well as for friends and strangers separately (n = 22
each) to evaluate our prediction that any inﬂuence of empathy
would be accentuated for friends.
When considering the SE for the joint condition, results for
the whole sample showed that the eﬀect was signiﬁcantly and
positively correlated with perspective taking as gaged by the IRI,
p = 0.016. As predicted, however, the impact of empathy was
enhanced among friends. For the friend pairs, the SE for the
joint condition was correlated with both IRI Perspective Taking,
TABLE 3 | Bivariate correlations between (1) the magnitude of the SE, and
(2) scores on the EQ and four scales of the IRI.
EQ IRI:PT IRI:FS IRI:EC IRI:PD
Whole group (n = 44)
Joint condition 0.23 0.36∗ 0.01 0.06 0.11
Individual condition 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.16 −0.13
Friends (n = 22)
Joint condition 0.51∗ 0.56∗∗ 0.16 0.24 0.24
Individual condition 0.00 0.06 0.52∗ 0.14 0.20
Strangers (n = 22)
Joint condition 0.00 0.17 −0.25 −0.17 0.04
Individual condition 0.30 0.18 −0.38 0.17 −0.50∗
EQ, empathy quotient; IRI:PT, perspective taking; IRI:FS, fantasy scale; IRI:EC,
empathic concern; IRI:PD, personal distress.
∗p < 0.05 two-tail, ∗∗p < 0.01 two-tail; significant correlations are shown in bold.
p= 0.007, and scores on the EQ, p= 0.015. For the stranger pairs,
by contrast, it failed to show a reliable correlation with any of the
empathy measures.
When considering the SE for the individual condition,
results for the whole sample were not correlated with empathy.
Nevertheless, for friends the eﬀect was augmented among
participants who scored higher on IRI Fantasy, p = 0.014. For
strangers, the only signiﬁcant result was a negative correlation
between the SE and IRI Personal Distress (i.e., participants who
reported higher levels of personal distress were less likely to show
a speed advantage on compatible trials relative to incompatible
trials when performing the task on their own).
To compare the impact of empathy on the SE between the
two groups, ANCOVAs were conducted that entered SE as
the dependent variable, group (i.e., friends or strangers) as the
independent variable, and empathy measure as the covariate.
These analyses were conducted for all empathy measures and
for both the joint and individual SEs, and produced signiﬁcant
outcomes in the following four cases. First, the ANCOVA
exploring group diﬀerences in the eﬀects of EQ scores on the joint
SE showed a marginal eﬀect of group, F(1,40) = 4.03, p = 0.052,
η2p = 0.09, a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the EQ, F(1,40) = 5.30,
p= 0.027, η2p = 0.12, and a signiﬁcant interaction, F(1,40)= 5.39,
p = 0.025, η2p = 0.12. Second, the ANCOVA exploring group
diﬀerences in the eﬀects of IRI Perspective Taking on the joint
SE showed a non-signiﬁcant eﬀect of group, F(1,40) = 2.04,
p= 0.161, η2p = 0.05, a signiﬁcant eﬀect of IRI Perspective Taking,
F(1,40) = 8.17, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.17, and a marginal interaction,
F(1,40) = 3.76, p = 0.059, η2p = 0.09. Third, the ANCOVA
exploring group diﬀerences in the eﬀects of IRI Fantasy on the
individual SE showed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of group, F(1,40)= 9.14,
p = 0.004, η2p = 0.19, a non-signiﬁcant eﬀect of IRI Fantasy,
F(1,40)= 0.53, p= 0.465, η2p = 0.01, and a signiﬁcant interaction,
F(1,40) = 10.22, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.20. Fourth, the ANCOVA
exploring group diﬀerences in the eﬀects of IRI Personal Distress
on the individual SE showed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of group,
F(1,40) = 4.91, p = 0.033, η2p = 0.11, a non-signiﬁcant eﬀect of
IRI Personal Distress, F(1,40) = 1.02, p = 0.318, η2p = 0.03, and
a signiﬁcant interaction, F(1,40) = 5.56, p = 0.023, η2p = 0.12.
Figure 2 depicts the group × empathy interactions for (1) EQ
and the joint SE, (2) IRI Perspective Taking and the joint SE, (3)
IRI Fantasy and the individual SE, and (4) IRI Personal Distress
and the individual SE.
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FIGURE 2 | Scatterplots showing the group × empathy interactions for (A) EQ and the joint condition Simon effect (SE), (B) perspective taking and
the joint condition SE, (C) fantasizing and the individual condition SE, and (D) personal distress and the individual condition SE.
Discussion
Consistent with previous investigations (e.g., Sebanz et al., 2003),
results for the joint condition showed a robust SE. Although
participants merely had to respond to a particular color ring and
withhold responding to the alternative color, they reacted more
slowly when the ﬁnger wearing the ring pointed toward their co-
actor than when it pointed in their own direction. This spatial
compatibility eﬀect emerged regardless of whether the co-actors
were friends or strangers and remained reliable when participants
were later asked to perform the task on their own.
But despite no eﬀect of prior acquaintance on the strength
of the joint SE, results of the present study were striking in
showing that empathy inﬂuenced the performance of friends to
a greater extent than strangers. When considering the whole
sample, there was indeed a signiﬁcant correlation between the
joint SE and cognitive perspective taking as gaged by the IRI.
However, this eﬀect was moderated by group such that its
magnitude was greater among friends than among strangers.
Similarly, a signiﬁcant interaction between group and the EQ
reﬂected an augmented inﬂuence of general empathy on the
joint SE in the case of friends. Group diﬀerences in the
pattern of correlations could not be attributed to discrepant
outcomes for empathy because friends and strangers performed
equivalently on all empathy measures. For friends, the ﬁnding
that the joint condition SE was predicted by the IRI perspective
taking scale (indexing the extent to which responders strive
to understand others’ thoughts, beliefs, and intentions) lends
weight to observations of a reduced eﬀect in clinical groups that
characteristically perform poorly on theory-of-mind tests, such as
patients with schizophrenia (Liepelt et al., 2012) or brain injury
(Humphreys and Bedford, 2011).
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It was further shown that the impact of empathy on the SE
diﬀered between friends and strangers even in the subsequent
individual condition. When friends performed the task on their
own, a larger SE was associated with higher scores on the
fantasizing scale of the IRI – this eﬀect was lacking in the
strangers group as reﬂected in a signiﬁcant interaction between
group and fantasizing. In contrast, strangers showed a negative
correlation between the individual SE and IRI Personal Distress
that failed to emerge among friends.
Previous research has produced evidence of top–down
modulation of empathy from brain centers that process
information about social relationships (e.g., Preston and de
Waal, 2002; Beckes et al., 2013; Decety, 2015). There is
also a growing literature documenting eﬀects of relational
context on social behavior and neural responses (reviews by
Beckes and Coan, 2013; Clark-Polner and Clark, 2014). In an
electrophysiological study, Leng and Zhou (2010) measured
event-related brain potentials while participants observed reward
feedback to either a friend or a stranger in a gambling task.
They found that a late component, the P300, was modulated
by the acquaintance variable – suggesting that outcome
evaluation engages a controlled process of cognitive appraisal
that is sensitive to interpersonal relationships. Using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fRMI) during a social interaction
simulation task, Gürog˘lu et al. (2008) reported that when
participants interacted with friends rather than strangers they
showed stronger activations in brain regions integral to empathy
and reward-related processes. These ﬁndings highlight the eﬀect
of social bonds on the aﬀective experience associated with
everyday human interactions. More generally, they resonate with
extensive developmental research documenting the important
role of emotional attachments in stimulating joint attention and
shared intentionality (Tomasello et al., 2005).
One possible conclusion to be drawn from our study is that
the underlying mechanisms of the joint SE diﬀered between
friends and strangers, with the former group showing a greater
inﬂuence of processes that were genuinely social. Assuming this
to be true, it follows that conclusions about joint action might
diﬀer profoundly depending on how well the co-actors know one
another. It has been suggested that the basic human drive to form
friendships might have originated in the evolutionary advantage
aﬀorded to cooperative- over individual activities (Baumeister
and Leary, 1995). From this perspective, social relationships and
joint action could be linked in a mutually reinforcing manner,
in keeping with evidence that encouraging participants to engage
in synchronized movement promotes emotional closeness and
improves their ability to pursue joint action goals (Valdesolo et al.,
2010).
On a social account, members of the friends group who had
better perspective-taking skills might have been more inclined
to note their co-actor’s role in the task – thus increasing their
susceptibility to interference when the pointing direction of index
ﬁnger signiﬁed the co-actor’s response (consistent with notions
of task co-representation; Sebanz et al., 2005a). Alternatively,
their proclivity for putting themselves in others’ shoes could
have fostered a sense of collaboration with the co-actor that
posed challenges of agent identiﬁcation on incompatible trials
(as suggested by notions of agent co-representation; Philipp
and Prinz, 2010; Wenke et al., 2011). Consistent with the
latter interpretation, Wenke et al. (2011) obtained preliminary
evidence linking general empathy with impairments of self/other
diﬀerentiation. In their study, participants (who faced one
another) were each responsible for binary go/no-go responses to
a central colored circle (the target) ﬂanked by two other circles.
For example, one participant responded to a blue target with a
left key press and to a red target with a right key press, whereas
the other participant responded to a yellow target with a left
key press and to a green target with a right key press. Although
irrelevant to the participant’s response, the ﬂanker circles could be
either ‘own color’ or ‘other color’ and signal either the same key
press (compatible trial) or the opposing key press (incompatible
trial). Whereas results failed to support the hypothesis that
participants would be inﬂuenced by knowledge of their co-actor’s
speciﬁc stimulus/response mappings, the ﬁnding that RTs on ‘go’
trials were faster when targets appeared next to ‘own’ ﬂankers
rather than ‘other’ ﬂankers was taken to mean that the ﬂankers
inﬂuenced the ease of agent identiﬁcation. Because the own-
ﬂanker advantage was accentuated for participants who scored
highly on self-reported empathy, Wenke et al. (2011) further
posited that agent identiﬁcation was impaired by empathic
processes.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the joint SE
was driven by referential coding in both groups but that event
representations diﬀered between friends and strangers. From
the perspective of the referential encoding account, action
control during joint tasks poses a discrimination problem;
speciﬁcally, participants are thought to represent events they
produce themselves in the same manner as events that are not
under their control regardless of whether the external events
are of human origin. It is assumed that event representations
comprise information about the characteristics and consequences
of actions, and that action selection involves activating codes
of to-be-generated action eﬀects (Hommel et al., 2001). The
problem of selecting the relevant representation from all
currently active representations is made more diﬃcult when the
sources are perceptually or conceptually similar, thus heightening
participants’ attention to whichever spatial features of the task
help to diﬀerentiate between self- and other-generated events
(Dolk et al., 2011, 2014). Applied to the present ﬁndings, notions
about referential coding raise the possibility that friends assigned
greater prominence than strangers to features within their event
representations that were socially relevant; consequently, friends
who were more empathic may have perceived greater similarity
between self- and other-generated events than did friends who
were less empathic. In the case of strangers, by contrast, overlap
between competing event representations may have reﬂected
diﬀerent kinds of attributes (perhaps more perceptual than
conceptual) that were not indexed by any of our individual
diﬀerences measures.
As expected, there were no indications that the joint SE for
friends was inﬂuenced by aﬀective empathy. Given the non-
signiﬁcant correlation between the joint SE and the empathic
concern scale of the IRI, the reason why the eﬀect showed a
positive association with the EQ appears to be the presence
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of numerous items within the EQ designed to gage cognitive
perspective taking. Theoretical accounts of empathy hold that
it reﬂects feelings of concordance between self and other.
According to Gallese (2001, p. 43), for example, empathy “is
relevant when accounting for all aspects of behavior enabling
us to establish a meaningful link between others and ourselves”
and he further speculated that it is grounded in a human mirror
neuron system that automatically simulates others’ emotional
experience. While mindful of the need for caution in interpreting
a null ﬁnding, our results could thus be taken to mean that
the similarity eﬀects driving the joint SE rely much more
on the controlled and self-referential aspects of empathy (i.e.,
perspective taking and theory-of-mind) than the aﬀective ones.
A related suggestion would be that cognitive empathy contributes
not just to the perception of similarity between acquainted co-
actors but to the selection of event features that discriminate
between them. Such a proposal is in line with evidence that
the brain regions underpinning cognitive empathy also play
a role in self-awareness (Decety and Sommerville, 2003). For
example, neuroimaging studies have found that the theory-
of-mind network becomes activated when people inhibit their
automatic imitation of observed actions (e.g., Spengler et al.,
2009) and strive to diﬀerentiate between their own actions and
emotions and those of other people (e.g., Schulte-Rüther et al.,
2007). A role of self/other diﬀerentiation in the joint SE was
demonstrated by Dolk et al. (2011). Their study used an auditory
version of the joint Simon task and aimed to manipulate the
extent to which participants integrated the actions of their co-
actor’s hand into their own body representation using either
synchronous or asynchronous stroking. Results showed that the
joint SE was greater following asynchronous stroking, in line with
the idea that it reﬂects segregation of self- versus other-related
information.
Notably, there was no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of perspective
taking on the SE when friends performed the task on their
own despite the fact that the eﬀect was not reliably smaller
than in the earlier joint condition. The phenomenon of a SE
in the absence of a co-actor mimics ﬁndings from previous
research whereby the eﬀect was observed evenwhen the co-actors
were unable to see or hear each other (e.g., Tsai et al., 2008;
Vlainic et al., 2010). It could be argued that the individual SE
reﬂected a carrying forward of spatial response codes acquired
during the earlier joint paradigm, in line with evidence of
similar transfer eﬀects when participants proceed to a go/no-
go version of the Simon task after previously having performed
the standard two-handed version (Ansorge and Wühr, 2009; and
see Sellaro et al., 2013, for a response-discrimination account
of the Tsai et al., 2008 ﬁndings). However, the ﬁnding that
the individual SE for friends was correlated positively with
fantasizing raises the possibility that participants continued to
conceptualize the task as a joint activity1. This being the case, it
could be surmised that diﬀerent processes underpinned friends’
performance in the joint- versus individual tasks; speciﬁcally,
1We acknowledge the need for further research to conﬁrm that fantasizing fails to
predict the individual SE among friends when the individual condition precedes the
joint condition.
such that they considered their co-actor’s agency and intentions
when he or she was physically present but treated them as
a spatial referent (in their imagination) when they were not.
Alternatively, whether the co-actor was present might have
inﬂuenced the type of social attributes that friends emphasized
in their event representations (with a shift from psychological
features in the joint condition to physical features in the
individual condition).
A reliable interaction between group and personal distress in
relation to the individual SE reﬂected the fact that its magnitude
was diminished for strangers with higher levels of personal
distress. We are reluctant to place much weight on this ﬁnding
given the failure of any of the empathy measures to predict
the SE for strangers in the joint condition but we speculate
that greater personal distress was linked with more self-focused
attention. An association been distress and self-focused attention
has been reported widely in the clinical psychology literature (e.g.,
Wells and Matthews, 2015) and may have been accentuated for
strangers relative to friends if they felt less relaxed during the test
session.
Conclusion
In summary, we have reported a novel demonstration that
the magnitude of the SE in the joint Simon task is predicted
by cognitive perspective taking but only when the co-actors
are friends. Given our relatively small sample size, the present
ﬁndings must be regarded as preliminary. Nevertheless, we
believe they highlight the importance of heeding the relationship
between participants in studies of human interaction. If social
similarity activates empathic processes then research using co-
actors who are unfamiliar with one another might fail to capture
the whole story regarding the nature of joint action. As we have
discussed, our ﬁndings are amenable to interpretation in terms
of both social (e.g., task co-representation) and non-social (e.g.,
referential coding) accounts. Even the latter explanation, though,
still recognizes the important contribution of social factors to
the joint SE by virtue of their role in shaping and discriminating
between action event representations.
Future research could extend the present work in a number of
ways. For example, the eﬀects of friendship on the joint Simon
task could be explored in more detail by gaging performance as a
function of how long friends have known each other. Rather than
simply comparing friends and strangers, this approach would
reveal whether longer durations of friendship result in larger
eﬀects of perspective-taking skills on the joint SE. Likewise,
varying the length of time before participants engage in the
individual version of the task (i.e., following the joint task) would
help to evaluate the suggestion that the SE for the individual
condition reﬂects spatial response coding as (presumably) such
an eﬀect should tend to dissipate over time.
It would also be informative to compare the impact of
perspective taking on the joint SE across diﬀerent variants of
the Simon task. Philipp and Prinz (2010) devised a paradigm
with diminished spatial characteristics; here, participants were
asked to respond to targets superimposed over task-irrelevant
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faces that corresponded to either their own face or the co-actor’s
face. Testing pairs of friends, they demonstrated that participants
reacted more slowly when the ‘go’ target appeared on the co-
actor’s face, although such impairment disappeared when the
task was performed individually. Based on the present ﬁndings,
we anticipate that this eﬀect will be positively correlated with
perspective taking in the case of friends but not strangers. In
contrast, we foresee no inﬂuence of perspective taking on the size
of the joint SE in paradigms where the co-actor is an inanimate
object.
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